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Abstract
Does the unication of retail and investment banking necessarily heighten risk in -
nancial markets? Using a simple two period intertemporal model with borrowers moral
hazard and uninsured risk, we argue that the integration in nancial service markets under
universal banking could give rise to a greater risk sharing arrangement. This could elimi-
nate the stock market premium attributed to borrowers moral hazard. Absent any other
frictions, we show that there is an unambiguous output and welfare gain from switching
to a universal banking system from retail banking because of this e¢ cient risk sharing.
This welfare gain is higher in economies prone to greater information friction caused by
borrowers moral hazard.
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1. Introduction
Following the great depression in the US, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 imposed
a separation between investment banking and commercial banking activities. The
former primarily deals with the activity of underwriting of securities while the latter
engages in the business of taking deposits and making loans. Thus nancial in-
termediaries could not participate in both equity and debt markets simultaneously.
A series of nancial reforms, beginning in the late eighties and culminating in the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (referred as GLB Act hereafter), had put an end
to this separation between commercial banking and investment banking, leading to
a greater integration in nancial services market.
In recent times, banks multifarious activities under the umbrella of universal
banking has been a subject of a heated debate. The regulators in the UK and the
USA are contemplating to curb multifarious activities of these institutions, especially
in areas where commercial banks enter the business of underwriting equities.1In light
of the current debate about the nancial crisis a natural question arises whether
this nancial integration heightened the risk in the nancial markets emanating from
moral hazard of borrowers?2 The answer to this question requires a careful theoretical
analysis of the relative performance of a fully integrated nancial system with respect
to a stand-alone system where both systems are vulnerable to the problem of moral
hazard.
There are two distinct types of moral hazard in the context of banking system.
The rst type refers to borrowers moral hazard where a bank cannot observe e¤orts
1The Financial Times (21th December, 2012) reported " In a 146-page assessment of the gov-
ernments planned Vickers reforms, the 10-member panel endorses the central idea that universal
banks should be made to erect a protective ringfence around their high-street banking activi-
ties........ The report also raises the prospect of a ban on proprietary trading whereby banks trade
securities for their own account in line with the incoming Volcker rule in the US. In an earlier
report ( April 21st, 2011), the newspaper also discussed about global convergenceof the policy
makers views regarding separation of various segments of activities that fall under the purview of
Universal Banking.
2A voluminous literature now exists explaining the anatomy of the US nancial crisis. For a
lucid exposition of the origin and progression of the US nancial crisis, see Choi (2013).
2
chosen by the borrower. The second type of lenders moral hazard, known as risk
shifting, is the selection of risky borrowers by banks unobserved by depositors.3 In
this paper, we exclusively focus on the rst type. We analyze issues of risk sharing
and the stock market premium (equity risk premium) in this context.4
We address the following questions in this paper: (a) does an integrated nancial
market exacerbate or mitigate risk emanating from moral hazard between borrowers
and the nancial institutions? In other words, which system (stand-alone or the
universal banking) handles the issue of borrowers moral hazard better? (b) How
is this risk priced in the equity issued by rms in each system? (c) What is the
real e¤ects of nancial integration, which include investment, output and consumer
welfare?
The primary issue under moral hazard is how to provide insurance to risk-averse
agents without jeopardizing their incentives to work harder. This trade-o¤ between
risk-sharing and e¢ ciency of e¤ort is resolved via optimal nancial contracts between
borrowers and nancial intermediaries. While both stand-alone and integrated (or
universal) banking systems strike optimal contracts to resolve the twin problems of
insurance and provision of e¤ort, the latter has more instruments which are more
e¤ective in an environment with multiple nancial markets such as equity and debt.
The integrated system can also take into account the feedback e¤ects between these
two markets on the borrowers portfolio choice between debt, loan (savings) and eq-
uity and their consequent impact on the allocation decisions such as consumption,
investment and work e¤orts.5 Thus overall risk undertaken by risk-averse agents is
smaller in magnitude in an integrated system. We argue that in the presence of
borrowers moral hazard, the banking unication per se cannot heighten risk pre-
mium in nancial markets. It will indeed give rise to an e¢ cient risk sharing among
3For a comprehensive treatment on this issue, see Freixas and Rochet (1997).
4Banerji and Basu (2012) explore the implications of lenders moral hazard issue emanating from
asymmetric information.
5It is well known that integration between two branches of activities could generate diversication
e¤ects resulting in reduction of risk. What the extant literature does not focus is the interrelation
between moral hazard, stock market risk and diversication which we do in this paper.
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lenders and borrowers and eliminate the risk premium caused by borrowers moral
hazard.6 In addition, such a nancial integration enhances e¢ ciency by decreasing
the wedge between expected marginal productivity of capital and the risk free rate,
which results in a rise in investment, output and welfare.
Although a large number of papers deal with the issue of universal banking just
after passing of GLB act, very little work is done about the riskiness of universal
banking vis-a-vis stand alone banking system which is the main focus of our pa-
per. Boyd, Chang and Smith (1998) model moral hazard between banks vis-à-vis
depositors and regulatory agency like FDIC. They show that banksequity stakes in
borrowing rm might make moral hazard problems severe. Our paper di¤ers from
Boyd et al. (1998) on several counts. First, in our model, information friction arises
due to moral hazard of the borrower as opposed to costly state verication. Second,
unlike them, deposit insurance is not an issue in our context. Instead, we focus on
the conict between incentives and risk sharing latent in nancial contracts. In light
of this conict, we evaluate the riskiness of alternative banking systems.
In recent years, there are empirical papers appraising the riskiness of alternative
banking systems for either Europe and US. Geyfman and Yeager (2009) found that
there was some risk reductions under universal banking but it is not statistically sig-
nicant. Lepitt et. al. (2009), found with a disaggregative analysis that risk shrank
for relatively smaller banks due to increased fees in underwriting and investment
banking activities. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), on the other hand, found
that while there was some reductions of risk at the lower level of non-deposit related
activities, it rose after a certain level which gives rise to a U-shaped pattern of risks
for the banks combining multiple activities. None of these papers explicitly focus on
6For simplicity, we abstract from aggregate risk in this paper to demonstrate the ine¢ ciency of
the contracting arrangement in a stand-alone banking system. In the absence of aggregate risks,
equity premium does not exist in a frictionless world. However, in the presence of information fric-
tion, nancial intermediaries may not be able to write e¢ cient contracts unless they have adequate
number of instruments.. See Freixas and Rochet (1997) for a comprehensive study on the nancial
contracting and banking. We introduce information friction due to borrowers moral hazard under
both regimes to examine its impact on prices of equity in a similar way dealt by Kahn (1990) and
Kocherlakota (1998).
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the relationship between stock market risk and borrowers moral hazard which is the
main focus of our paper.
Our paper is a theoretical investigation whether universal banking can reduce
stock market risk induced by borrowers moral hazard. We consider a scenario where
borrowers are risk averse and risk neutral banks o¤er contracts to the risk averse
agents with the goal to achieve e¢ cient consumption risk sharing. In our model,
the risk sharing under universal banking could be mimicked by a constrained social
planning optimum. On the other hand, such e¢ cient risk sharing is not possible
in a non-integrated banking system due to the legal separation between retail and
investment banking. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst paper
which shows such equivalence between the risk sharing arrangement under universal
banking and a constrained social planning optimum.
We also analyze the real e¤ects of alternative banking arrangement on capital
accumulation and output in a general equilibrium. We demonstrate that the invest-
ment and output are less in a stand-alone banking system compared to a universal
banking system. This happens because in a stand-alone system, bankers do not
control the borrowers trade in stocks as well as storage decision. An endogenous
borrowing constraint stemming from the borrowers moral hazard thus restricts bor-
rowing which gives rise to a spread between the expected marginal product and the
real interest rate. The spread is driven by the stock market premium. A similar
endogenous borrowing constraint also arises in a universal banking system but since
the banker also stipulates the storage decision of the borrower in the contract, such
a distortionary e¤ect on capital accumulation is mitigated. Since consumption risk
is e¢ ciently shared under universal banking, there is an unambiguous welfare gain
in switching from stand alone to the universal banking regime. This welfare gain
is higher in economies which are more prone to the information friction induced by
borrowers moral hazard. We demonstrate this formally by making explicit welfare
comparisons using a parametric example based on our model.7
7To the best of our knowledge, the only recent paper which analyzes the macroeconomic e¤ects
of retail and universal banking and makes a welfare comparison is Damjanovic, Damjanovic and
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We use a stylized two-period model without aggregate risk but only with idiosyn-
cratic project risks and compare equity risk premium and the consequent impact on
real allocation on capital under two alternative banking environments. In the rst
stand-alone banking system, a nancial intermediary operates only in the domain of
commercial banking (deposits and borrowing) but is prohibited from operating in eq-
uity markets by law. Loans and deposits are the only two contractual instruments
available to the banker. In the second universal banking regime, the banker has
several contractual instruments which stipulate the borrowers saving, loan, stock
purchase and storage decisions. In both regimes, the only source of information fric-
tion is borrowers private information about his choice of e¤orts in production. In
order to eliminate shirking under both regimes, nancial intermediaries strike incen-
tive compatible contracts, which partially insure individual consumption giving rise
to an endogenous borrowing constraint.8 Hence, the volatility of consumption across
both states of nature is an outcome of the incentive constraint.9 Yet, a positive
equity risk premium emerges in an environment without aggregate risk where banks
are not permitted to transact in the equity market. This premium disappears in a
world of complete integration of nancial services markets which is the hallmark of
universal banking.
The paper is organized as follows: In the following section, we lay out the basic
model. Section 3 develops the contracting environment of a stand-alone banking
system. Section 4 does the same for a universal banking system. Section 5 works
out a parametric example compares and contrasts the equity premia in two regimes
Nolan (2012) in a DSGE framework. However, they do not address the e¤ect of borrowers moral
hazard on the stock market premium which is the central aim of our paper.
8In contrast with the extant literature dealing with borrowing constraint (Constantinides et
al., 2002), our exercise highlights the role of the banking environment in explaining the size of
the premium. Our model has a direct bearing on a growing body of literature exploring the link
between asset market frictions and the premium. Such frictions tend to arise out of incomplete
markets or borrowing constraints. Constantinides and Du¢ e (1996), and Heaton and Lucas (1996,
1997) looked for explanations for a high premium in terms of incomplete markets where individuals
fail to insure their income in the presence of permanent shocks.
9In contrast with Constantinides et al. (2002), in our model such an incentive constraint makes
the borrowing constraint endogenous.
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as well as welfare. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
We consider a simple intertemporal general equilibrium model in which there is
a continuum of identical agents in the unit interval who live only for two periods. At
date 1, a stand-in agent is endowed with y units of consumption goods, and equity,
which represents a claim to date 2 output. The value of this equity is Q, which is
basically the date 1 value of date 2 output. This Q can be divided in shares. Suppose
there are x such shares in supply. Out of these x shares, the agent keeps x and sells
x   x at the spot price Q. The buying and selling of shares takes place in period
1. Since x is a constant, it can be normalized to unity. The representative agents
own share (x) gives him proceeds in the second period. The production technology
together with the resolution of the state of nature outlined below determines his
payo¤s in period 2.
The agent invests k units of capital at date 1, which goes through a production
process and results in output depending on the interaction between idiosyncratic risks
and the agents choice of e¤ort. Individuals e¤ort is a binary variable which takes
a value equal to 0 for no e¤ort and 1 for positive e¤ort. If the agent exerts e¤ort in
period 1, then output will be f(k) with probability p, and 0 with the complementary
probability. This basically means that a fraction p of agents in the unit mass succeed
while the remaining 1   p fail. If they do not exert e¤ort, output will be f(k) and
0 with the corresponding probabilities q and 1   q respectively where p > q. The
disutility of e¤ort is given by '. The function f(k) is increasing in k. All the risks
in technology are idiosyncratic in nature. There is no aggregate risk.
There are competitive banks, which provide loans (l) to agents in the rst period
and charge a borrowing rate of interest. The intermediaries also accept a deposit
(s) from individuals and o¤er a safe rate (r) to depositors. These loans are subject
to default risk. If the project succeeds, the agent makes a repayment of (R) to the
bank and if it fails he walks out paying nothing (due to limited liability). How-
ever, if project risks are independent and individuals are distributed in a continuum,
7
intermediaries can generate a safe rate of return (r) by invoking the law of large
numbers.10
Households budget constraints are thus given by
c1 + s+ k + xQ = y +Q+ l (1)
cg2 = xf(k) R + (1 + r)s and cb2 = (1 + r)s (2)
where cg2 = consumption in the second period if the project is successful, c
b
2 =consumption
in the second period when the project is unsuccessful, and s = individuals saving.
2.1. Preferences
The utility function facing each agent is additively separable in consumption at
each date and is of the form:
u(c1) + v(c2) (3)
where ci= consumption in period i, i = 1; 2, u(:)and v(:) are: (a) thrice continuously
di¤erentiable, (b) concave, and (c) have a convex marginal utility function. Hence,
agents are risk-averse.
The expected utility of a representative agent given that he puts e¤ort is:
U = u(c1) + pv(c
g
2) + (1  p)v(cb2)  '
10The probability of all projects failing is close to zero because (1-p)n approaches zero as the
number of independent projects, n approaches innity. By this, we assume no-bankruptcy for
the banks. See Azariadis and Smith (1993) for a similar model of intermediation under adverse
selection.
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which, based on the budget constraints outlined in (1) and (2), can be rewritten as:
U = u(y+Q+ l  s k xQ) +pv[xf(k) R+ (1 + r)s] + (1 p)v[(1 + r)s] ' (4)
2.2. Information Friction and Partial Consumption Insurance
We now introduce informational frictions due to moral hazard in the spirit of
Holmstrom (1979) as well as Kahn (1990) and Kocherlakota (1998). Throughout
the paper, we assume that e¤orts exerted by individuals are unobserved by nancial
rms. The e¤ort is value enhancing in the sense that it increases the probability of
successful state from q to p, where p > q but also extra e¤ort is costly to individuals.
Hence, nancial contracts must incorporate enough incentives to elicit e¤orts from
households. This requires households net expected utility from expending e¤orts
must exceed from the corresponding pay-o¤ when they shirk. In other words, in
order to alleviate the moral hazard problems, the relevant incentive constraint must
satisfy the following condition:
u(y +Q+ l   s  k   xQ) + pv(xf(k) R + (1 + r)s) + (1  p)v((1 + r)s)  ' 
u(y +Q+ l   s  k   xQ) + qv(xf(k) R + (1 + r)s) + (1  q)v((1 + r)s)
which can be written more compactly as:
v(xf(k) R + (1 + r)s)  v((1 + r)s)  '
p  q (5)
The interpretation of (5) is quite intuitive. It suggests that nancial contracts must
incorporate enough incentives such that household exerts e¤ort. This constraint
requires that the households consumption is not perfectly smoothed out. It is well
9
known that full insurance of consumption would destroy individual incentive to exert
higher levels of e¤ort. This can be easily seen that the inequality (5) is violated if
consumptions are equal in both states of nature. The intermediaries would thus issue
a loan and charge a repayment such that consumption is only partially insured.11
We will see later that this incentive constraint generates an endogenous borrowing
constraint.
3. Stand-alone Banking System
We now consider a non-integrated contractual arrangement in which nancial in-
termediaries accept deposits and lend money to rms but their participation in the
equity market is prohibited by legislation. This type of environment mirrors a typ-
ical stand-alone banking system where retail banking is separated from investment
banking. Think of households owning their own investment banking rms and issu-
ing shares to each other. Shares are claims to capital stock owned by the households.
Banks are typically retails banks which use R; l; s as their contracting instruments
in dealing with the households/borrowers. Share trading (x) is kept outside the
purview of the nancial contract stipulated by the bank, which is a distinguishing
feature of the stand-alone banking system. The capital accumulation decision (k)
of the households is also not used as a contracting instrument because it is pro-
hibitively expensive for the retails banks to monitor the investment decisions of the
households. Since share purchase, x and the storage, k are outside the the contract
space, households are free to choose x and k.
Given the limited liability constraint and assuming that agents have exerted ef-
forts, banks expected prot is:
E = p[R  (1 + r)l] + (1  p)[0  (1 + r)l] = pR  (1 + r)l (6)
11It is straightforward to verify that in the presence of full information about entrepreneurial
e¤ort, full consumption insurance takes place. All the idiosyncratic project risks will be transferred
from the risk averse households to the risk neutral nancial intermediaries. The banks pool the
risk by redistributing consumption between the lucky and unlucky households in an actuarially fair
fashion, meaning cg2 = c
b
2 = pf(k).
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If there is free entry and exit, then zero expected prot of the intermediaries implies:
pR  (1 + r)l = 0 (7)
The competitive banks design an optimal contract with households with respect to
their deposits with the bank (s), loans they receive (l), repayment of loans (R). Such
an optimal contract maximizes the households expected utility subject to zero prot
condition given by (7) and the incentive compatibility condition (5). The zero prot
condition appears due to the assumption that numerous intermediaries compete with
each other that drives expected prot to zero. In other words, the household faces a
menu of choices for s; l and R which satisfy banks zero prot condition.
The household now solves two distinct sets of problems: (i) as an equity holder
and entrepreneur (choosing x and k), and (ii) as a borrower and depositor (choos-
ing s; l; R) . This separating role emerges due to a contracting environment that
segregates retail and investment banking. Regarding (i), since households own their
respective investment banks, they trade in securities with each other and invest in
physical capital that solves the optimization problem free from any incentive con-
straint stipulated by the retail banks.
To solve (i), the household takes s; l and R as parametrically given and maximizes
(4) with respect to x and k only. This yields the following familiar Euler equations:
x :  u0(c1)Q+ pv0(cg2)f(k) = 0 (8)
k :  u0(c1) + pv0(cg2)xf 0(k) = 0 (9)
Regarding (ii), the retail bank stipulates the following optimal contract problem for
11
the household:
Maxfl;s;Rg U = u(y +Q+ l   s  k   xQ) + pv(xf(k) R
+(1 + r)s) + (1  p)v((1 + r)s)  '
subject to (7) and (5). Note that while solving this optimal contract problem, the
retail banks treat k and x as parametrically given because these are outside the
purview of their savings and loan contracts.
The problem can be rewritten in the form of the following Lagrangian:
Lmaxfl;sg = u(y +Q+ l   s  k   xQ) + pv(xf(k) + (1 + r)(s 
l
p
))
+(1  p)v((1 + r)s)  '
+fv(xf(k) + (1 + r)(s  l
p
))  v((1 + r)s)  '
p  qg (10)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (5). The rst-order conditions
are:
s :  u0(c1) + (1 + r)[fpv0(cg2) + (1  p)v0(cb2)g+ fv0(cg2)  v0(cb2)g] = 0 (11)
l : u0(c1)  (1 + r)v0(cg2)[1 +

p
] = 0 (12)
Although households two problems (i) investment banking and (ii) retail banking
look seemingly separate, they are interdependent. The amount of shares transacted
and the storage by households a¤ect the incentive constraint (5), and thus it has
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an impact on the optimal contract problem (10). On the other hand, terms of
contracts, given by (s; l; R), a¤ect marginal utility of the household member and
thus inuence households decisions to buy shares. This interdependence between
the optimal contracting problems in credit market and the maximization problem of
the household in equity market can be resolved by invoking a Nash equilibrium, in
which all these variables are determined simultaneously which we describe now.
3.1. Characterization of Equilibrium
D1. Given r; s;Q; l; R, the household chooses the share holding x, and storage k
which maximizes its expected utility (4) subject to the banks zero prot condition
(7).
D2. Given r;Q, k and x, competitive retail banks o¤er a menu of contracts,
s; l; R which maximize households expected utility (4) subject to the banks zero
prot condition (7) and incentive compatibility condition (4).
D3. The share and loan markets clear meaning x = 1 and s = l.12
Proposition 1. The households are credit constrained and risks are uninsured so
that
cg2 > c
b
2
Proof. Appendix.
The incentive compatibility constraint deters full consumption insurance and
leading to endogenous variations in consumption across good and bad states of na-
ture. The nancial intermediaries create such wedge by rationing the size of the loan.
12While D1 and D2 capture micro economics of optimal contracting between households and
nancial intermediaries, D3 illustrates the general equilibrium component of the model. For similar
approach towards nancial contracting and general equilibrium, under adverse selection (as opposed
to moral hazard here) see Azariadis and Smith (1993).
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The household would always wish that they could save and borrow more. The incen-
tive compatibility constraint is thus imposing an endogenous borrowing constraint
on individuals.13
3.2. Equity Risk Premium
Denote the proportional equity risk premium in this non-integrated contract econ-
omy as EPNI which , by denition, is equal to the ratio of the expected gross return
to equity given by
pf(k)
Q
and the (gross) risk-free interest rate, which is (1 + r). If
the ratio exceeds unity, then the return on equity generates a premium over the safe
saving deposits and if the ratio equals unity, then there is no risk premium. We have
the following proposition.
Proposition 2. EPNI > 1
Proof. Appendix.
The equity risk premium in a stand-alone banking system with non-integrated
nancial markets is positive. It is determined by the shadow price () of the incen-
tive constraint. Households while participating in the stock market bear a greater
uninsurable consumption risk than when they participate in the loan market. This
is because the loan market transactions are under the purview of the optimal con-
tract while the stock market transactions are not. The Lagrange multiplier, which
is basically the shadow price of incentive compatibility constraint, drives a wedge
between the perceived intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) of the
consumer/shareholders and consumer/depositors.14
13The endogenous borrowing constraint arises due to the asymmetric information between the
borrowers and lenders. Lenders cannot observe the e¤ort of the borrower/entrepreneur. The severity
of asymmetric information can a¤ect borrowers access to nance. Monsour (2014) explores this
empirically for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) regions.
14One may as well interpret this stand-alone banking system as a scenario where the market is
not complete. In an incomplete market environment typically the stochastic discount factor is not
unique (see, Cochrane, 2001, p. 68 for a formal discussion). This might explain why the perceived
IMRS of stocks holders di¤ers from that of the depositors to support the same real allocation.
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3.3. Real E¤ects of a Stand-alone Banking System
Since agents choose capital stock on their own, they do not internalize the incen-
tive constraints in their capital accumulation decision. Hence, there is a gap between
interest rate and the expected marginal product of capital, implying that capital is
costlier than the risk free rate. The cost is determined by the shadow price () of
the incentive constraint which leads to underaccumulation of capital in a stand alone
banking system. This can be easily checked from (9) and (12) by setting the stock
market equilibrium condition x = 1. We have:
pf 0(k) = (1 + r)(1 +

p
) > 1 + r (13)
The endogenous credit constraint thus drives a wedge between interest rate and
the expected marginal product of capital. The spread is determined by the stock
market premium. This results in an underaccumulation of capital in comparison
with the universal banking benchmark set forth next. We will see later that this
underaccumulation of capital is at the very root of the lower welfare in a stand-alone
banking system vis-a-vis universal banking arrangement.
4. Universal Banking
The essence of universal banking is that nancial intermediary holds an equity
position in the project of the households. This is in sharp contrast with the stand-
alone banking scenario where households only hold equity positions to each others
projects and nancial intermediaries specialize in savings and loan activities. Thus,
the nancial intermediaries in a universal banking scenario have unrestricted access
to all markets. This is why we alternatively call this arrangement an integrated
nancial services market. Each intermediary can stipulate the number of shares to
be purchased by the borrower/shareholder as well as determining its own equity po-
sition.15The universal banks, however, encounter the moral hazard of the borrowing
15We will see later that the division of equity between the banks and the households is irrelevant
in determining the real allocation.
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rm exactly similar to the case discussed in the previous sub-section.
The budget constraints of the household in a universal banking scenario is thus:
c1 + s+ k + x
hQ = y + (1  xb)Q+ l (14)
cg2 = x
hf(k) R + (1 + r)s and cb2 = (1 + r)s (15)
where xh =household/entrepreneurs share to the tree Q and xb =bankers share to
the tree Q. If the project succeeds the prot of the bank is:
g = xbf(k) +R  (1 + r)l (16)
If the project fails, the prot is:
b =  (1 + r)l (17)
The expected prot of the bank is:
E() = pR  (1 + r)l + pxbf(k) = 0 (18)
which is zero in a free entry competitive equilibrium.
Given Q and r, the universal bank thus solves an optimal contract problem for
the household as follows:
Maxfl;s;k;R;xh;xbg U = u(y +Q(1  xb) + l   s  k   xhQ)
+pv(xhf(k) R + (1 + r)s) + (1  p)v((1 + r)s)  '
subject to the zero prot condition:
pR  (1 + r)l + pxbf(k) = 0 (19)
16
and the incentive compatibility condition :
v(xhf(k) R + (1 + r)s)  v((1 + r)s)  '
p  q (20)
which can be rewritten after substituting out R using the zero prot condition:
Lmax fl;s;k;xh;xbg = u(y +Q+ l   s  k   (xh + xb)Q)
+pv((xh + xb)f(k) + (1 + r)(s  l
p
)) + (1  p)v((1 + r)s)  '
+[v((xh + xb)f(k) + (1 + r)(s  l
p
))  v((1 + r)s)  '
p  q ]
First-order conditions are:
s :  u0(c1) + (1 + r)[fpv0(cg2) + (1  p)v0(cb2)g+ fv0(cg2)  v0(cb2)g] = 0 (21)
l : u0(c1)  (1 + r)v0(cg2)[1 +

p
] = 0 (22)
k :  u0(c1) + v0(cg2)(xh + xb)pf 0(k)[1 +

p
] = 0 (23)
xh; xb :  u0(c1)Q+ pv0(cg2)f(k)[1 +

p
] = 0 (24)
Substituting out  the following rst order conditions are obtained:
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xh; xb :
1
u0(y   k) =
Q
pf(k)

p
v0(cg2)
+
1  p
v0(cb2)

(25)
l :
1
u0(y   k) =
1
1 + r

p
v0(cg2)
+
1  p
v0(cb2)

(26)
k :
1
u0(c1)
=
1
pf 0(k)

p
v0(cg2)
+
1  p
v0(cb2)

(27)
Note that the rst order conditions do not depend on the division of equity (xh; xb)
between banks and the households which resembles Modigliani-Miller neutrality re-
sult. This irrelevance of capital structure is due to the fact that banks act like a
social planner in allocating resources to maximize households expected utility and
thus how the ownership claim is shared between banks and households has no real
e¤ects. This point will be made clear in proposition 4 later.
4.1. Characterization of Equilibrium
C1. Given r, Q, the universal banker chooses l; s; R, xh and xb optimally which
satisfy the above rst order conditions.
C2. Loan and Equity markets clear meaning s = l and xh + xb = 1.
From these rst-order conditions, we immediately deduce the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 3. The price of equity is: Q = pf(k)
1+r
and the equity premium is zero.
The proof directly follows from (22) and (24). The zero equity risk premium
results from the fact that there is no aggregate risk in this model. All the idiosyncratic
individual risks are properly contracted. The presence of borrowing constraints and
uninsurable risk, per se, thus cannot explain the existence of equity premium, as long
as all project risks are contracted in advance. A social planner can as well allocate
the consumption risk for an economy like this. In fact, the nancial intermediary
in this universal banking arrangement reproduces the outcome of a social planning
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problem so that the resulting outcome is constrained Pareto e¢ cient. The following
proposition makes it evident.
Proposition 4. The following social planning problem is isomorphic to the present
optimal contract environment.
Max u(c1) + pv(c
g
2) + (1  p)v(cb2) ((P))
s.t. c1 + k = y (28)
pcg2 + (1  p)cb2 = pf(k) (29)
and
v(cg2)  v(cb2) 
'
p  q
Proof : Appendix.
5. A Parametric Example
In this section, we present a parametric example to gain further insight into the
macro nancial e¤ects of information friction caused by borrowers moral hazard.
Assume the following parametric specications of the utility and production func-
tions:
U = ln c1 + p ln c
g
2 + (1  p) ln cb2   ' (30)
and
f(k) = ak: (31)
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where a is a positive total factor productivity (TFP) term. Using this specication,
we get the following closed form solution for the proportional equity premium EPNI .
The appendix provides an outline of the derivation.
EPNI =

1 + p(  1) (32)
where
 = exp(
 
p  q ) (33)
and the capital stock is given by:
kNI =

1 + p(  1)
1 + p(  1) + 

y (34)
The Lagrange multiplier is directly proportional to the ratio of consumption in
good and bad states which keeps the household just indi¤erent between shirking and
not shirking. In the context of the logarithmic utility function, this ratio is positively
related to the disutility of e¤ort  . The higher the disutility of e¤ort  , the greater
the value of . Thus  is a measure of informational friction. Note that a higher
informational friction raises the uninsurable risk for all the households. Since the
household, while participating in the share market, bears even a greater uninsur-
able consumption risk, the equity risk premium is monotonically increasing in the
informational friction parameter . When  is zero,  equals unity, in which case
the equity risk premium vanishes due to the absence of informational friction. The
greater the ,the larger the output loss and higher the premium.
A similar calculation for the log utility function shows that the capital stock (kI)
under universal banking is:
kI =
y
2
> kNI (35)
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Comparing (35) with (34), it easy to verify that kI > kNI because  > 1: There is
underaccumulation of capital in a non-integrated banking system compared to uni-
versal banking system. The universal banking system enhances productive e¢ ciency
and also reduces risks. This is consistent with our earlier results.
5.1. Welfare comparison of two banking systems
We are now ready to make a formal consumer welfare comparison of these two
banking arrangements. We stick to the above log utility specication which enable
us to get closed form solutions for decision rules. Dene households expected utility
under the universal banking system with integrated nancial markets as Wu and the
corresponding expected utility in a stand-alone banking system as Ws. We have the
following proposition.
Proposition 5. Wu > Ws
Proof: Appendix.
The social welfare under universal banking system is unambiguously higher than
in the stand alone arrangement. This is not surprising because we have shown
earlier that there is underaccumulation of capital in a stand-alone banking system
compared to the universal banking system. In addition, the consumption under
universal banking can be supported by a constrained social planning problem.
Figure 1 plots the welfare di¤erential (Wu  Ws) between universal banking and
the stand alone banking systems for a range of values for the information friction
parameter : The idiosyncratic probability of project success p is xed at 0.5. There
is greater welfare gain from a switch to the universal banking regime in economies
where the information friction is higher. 16
16This monotonicity property is robust to alternative choices of p:
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Fig 1: Welfare gain from a switch to the universal banking system for alternative 
values
6. Conclusion
The unication of commercial and investment banking in the United States is
often attributed to the heightened nancial risk in the context of present nancial
crisis. In this paper, we argue that if nancial contracts are e¢ ciently designed, such
a unication in fact might lead to better risk sharing and thus a lower stock market
premium. In reality, investment banks perform far more complex tasks than what we
consider in this paper. They involve underwriting of wide class of securities, including
stocks, bonds and options, repurchase of shares and pricing of IPOs. Complexities
of nancial contracts partly depend on the degree of informational asymmetry be-
tween banks and the rms. Instead of going into such details, which are specic to
individual cases, we discuss the ability of a bank to intervene simultaneously in debt
and equity markets.
Our model does not necessarily imply that the universal banking should replace
the stand-alone banking system. The lesson from this stylized model is that the pol-
icy maker should analyze carefully the source of information friction in the banking
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system before implementing a banking reform. If borrowers moral hazard is the pre-
dominant source of information friction, perhaps a proper nancial contract within
the purview of universal banking system could promote economic e¢ ciency. Our
model only restricts attention to moral hazard between borrowing rms and banks.
It abstracts from a second type of informational friction which emanates from the
selection of borrowers by banks unobserved by depositors. Banerji and Basu (2012)
argue that e¢ cient risk sharing may not be possible in such an environment due to
conict of interest between banks and shareholders. Future extension of our work
would be to evaluate alternative banking systems when both types of information
frictions are present. It may be also worthwhile to extend our model to dynamic
setting with repeated moral hazard.
A. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: It can be shown that incentive constraint binds with
equality, which means  > 0 (see, also the proof of proposition 2 below to see why
 > 0). Hence, from the constraint it follows immediately that cg2 > c
b
2. We can
verify now from (12) that
u0(c1)  (1 + r)v0(cg2) > 0 (A.1)
implying that individuals would be better-o¤ with additional borrowing. (End of
proof)
Proof of Proposition 2: Dene the proportional equity premium as:
EPNI =
pf(k)
Q(1 + r)
(A.2)
Using (8) and (12), we get:
Q =
pf(k)
[1 + 
p
](1 + r)
(A.3)
Plugging (A.3) into (A.2) we get:
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EPNI = 1 +

p
(A.4)
From (11) and (12) and we get,
 =
p(1  p)[v0(cb2)  v0(cg2)]
(1  p)v0(cg2) + pv0(cb2)
> 0 (A.5)
because cg2 > c
b
2 ) v0(cb2) > v0(cg2) which means  > 0. (End of Proof)
Proof of Proposition 3: Substitute the equilibrium conditions s = l, xh+xb=1,
into the households date 1 budget constraint (14) to obtain c1 + k = y. Next use
the date 2 budget constraints (15) for good and bad states to observe:
pcg2 + (1  p)cb2 = pxhf(k)  pR + (1 + r)l
Next plug in the zero expected prot condition (19) to obtain
pcg2 + (1  p)cb2 = pf(k)
which is the social planners second period resource constraint.
In the next step, check that the rst order condition of the social planning problem
(P) is given by (27).(End of proof)17
B. Appendix
B.1. Derivation of key equations
Equations ( 32) through (35)
Using (11) and (12), we could rewrite the rst-order condition in an inverse Euler
equation form:
17It is instructive to note that the rst order condition of this social planning problem resembles
the Pareto optimal contract condition in Rogerson (1985) although Rogersons setting is quite
di¤erent from ours.
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(1 + r)
u0(c1)
=
p
v0(cg2)
+
(1  p)
v0(cb2)
(B.6)
Then by using the logarithmic utility we get:
pcg2 + (1  p)cb2 = (1 + r)c1 (B.7)
Note rst that the rst order conditions for stock and storage are:
x :  Q=c1 + (p=cg2)ak = 0 (B.8)
k :  (1=c1) + (p=cg2)xa = 0 (B.9)
Using (B.8) and (B.9) with asset market equilibrium (x = 1) one gets: Q = k
implying a unit Tobins q. From (B.9) and the date 1 resource constraint (1)
together with the loan market clearance, s = l, this means that,
cg2 = ap(y   k) (B.10)
Use of the incentive constraint (5) means
cg2 = c
b
2 (B.11)
which upon substitution in (B.7) gives:
cb2 + apk = apy (B.12)
Using (1), (2), (7) and the loan market clearing condition, s = l; one gets:
cg2 = ak + (1 + r)(1 
1
p
)s (B.13)
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cb2 = (1 + r)s (B.14)
and
c1 = y   k (B.15)
Using (B.11), (B.13), (B.14) and the loan market equilibrium condition s = l
gives:
l =
pak
(1 + r)[1 + p(  1)] (B.16)
which upon plugging into (B.14) together with s = l gives:
cb2 =
apk
1 + p(  1) (B.17)
which upon substitution in (B.12) gives:
kNI =
1 + p(  1)
1 + + p(  1)y (B.18)
This proves (34). The equity premium expression (32) can be obtained by using
(A.4), (A.5) and (B.11).
Use (27) and (29) to get (35). Use (29) and the incentive constraint (5) to get
cb2 =
apk
p+1 p which upon plugging in (B.7) and using (B.11) yields k
I = y=2: The
inequality in (35) is evident by noting that  > 1:
B.2. Proof of Proposition 5
Given the log utility specication (30), it is straightforward to compute the ex-
pected utility under the stand-alone banking environment. Simply plug in the con-
sumption and investment decision rules into (30) to obtain:
Ws = (1 + p) ln+ 2 ln y   2 ln(1 + + p(  1)) + ln ap  ' (B.19)
26
Next plugging the consumption decision rules under universal banking into the
expected utility function, we get:
Wu = 2 ln
y
2
+ p ln+ ln
ap
(p+ 1  p)   ' (B.20)
Thus using (B.19) and (B.20), we get the welfare di¤erential
Wu  Ws =   ln

4(p+ 1  p)
(  1)2(1  p)2 + 4(p+ 1  p)

> 0
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